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A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR BRAZIL


As used herein, contingency refers to any major attempt to significantly change, by violence or otherwise, the character of the regime governing Brazil. This paper should not be construed as predicting that the Goulart Regime as presently constituted will be overthrown. Nor is it the policy of the U.S. Government to attempt to bring about the overthrow of the Goulart Regime.

Some Underlying Assumptions

1. Contingency is not intended to describe rightist coup plottings such as have been occurring recently in Brazil. Given the existing constitutional democratic regime, it is difficult to conceive of any significant change in U.S. posture toward these various coup plottings. U.S. association with such plottings should be avoided as a matter of basic policy because (a) it could be construed as U.S. intervention by Goulart - a situation which would be damaging to U.S. interests (b) such plottings can be used as a pretext by Goulart to strengthen his own powers. It will of course be necessary that the U.S. maintain covert contact with the various anti-Goulart groups for the purpose of intelligence collection and for the exercise of a moderating influence, where appropriate.

2. Any change in the existing constitutional democratic regime is highly unlikely if such change is opposed by the bulk of the armed forces. If the military forces are substantially

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united they can be a decisive force for or against a basic change in the character of the existing regime. A contingency can take on serious proportions therefore only as it is supported by the military or involves a significant division within the armed forces. Without significant division in the armed forces any revolt from the right or left can be put down by them.

3. A democratically inclined group seeking to attain or maintain national leadership in Brazil would be most reluctant to request overt U.S. intervention or support, unless (a) there were clear indications of Soviet or Cuban intervention, or (b) they became convinced that U.S. support was essential to prevent Communist control of the country. It is more than likely, however, that the U.S. would be asked for some form of covert support.


(Caution would need to be exercised on our part against the loose use of the Communist label.)

Alternative Contingencies

Against the foregoing background, the following alternative contingencies deserve consideration:

- (a) An extreme leftist revolt against the Goulart regime, having the support of a segment of the armed forces. Any sizeable amount of Brazilian military support to such an extreme left revolt is highly unlikely, given the combination of commitments entailed, i.e., support to the

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
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extreme left and opposition against the constitutional regime. In view of this, such a revolt could be serious but most likely not threatening to the regime, except as it might lead to alternative (c) below.

- (b) Overt, organized resistance by sizeable democratic forces, with considerable military support, against Goulart effort to seize authoritarian power. This would most likely occur in response to national intervention into one or more states, the closing of Congress, or some other action widely regarded as a mortal threat to democracy or as unconstitutional. The move by Goulart would probably be toward a Peronist, rather than a communist, type dictatorship although entailing dangerous and potentially explosive accommodations and alliances with the extreme left over which Goulart may not be able to maintain effective control.
- (c) The removal of Goulart by the military or by other forces in order to obtain a "more effective" national leadership. Goulart could be "persuaded" to resign, could be made to "see the handwriting on the wall" - in short, willingly or unwillingly, be forced to make way for a successor. This would most likely derive from a state of accumulated collective exasperation over a progressively more disturbing political and economic check.
- (d) A gradual takeover by extreme leftists ultranationalists with

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or without Goulart collaboration accompanied by the neutralization or fractionalization of the armed forces and therefore meeting only token or ineffective resistance. In this situation elements of the extreme left would continue moving into positions of authority without creating a sufficiently firm, substantial and clear cut issue against which an effective opposition could be mounted.

A. Extreme Leftist Revolt:

In this situation, it can be expected that the United States will condemn the revolt, will give arms and other help to the Government of Brazil if requested, and will exploit the experience to encourage both the containment of extremist excesses and a serious approach to constructive reform by the Brazilian government. It seems unlikely, however, that the help of U.S. forces would be requested. Any advance preparation for such U.S. assistance would be governed by the same limitations that are set forth in "B" below.

If one were to attempt an assessment of likelihood, this contingency would seem to be the least likely of those presented in this paper because of the extreme reluctance of a large portion of the left to go it alone and the improbability that any significant element of the military would support such an attempt.

B. Democratic Revolt Against Excesses of Regime:

This implies the possibility of civil war or at least a clash

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between democratic forces and the incumbent Goulart regime. In such circumstance we should carefully abstain from giving support to Goulart by public pronouncement, by arms supply, or in any other way. We should maintain an initial non-interventionist posture but at the same time seek ways and means of assisting the democratic forces. Such actions would be limited by the degree to which they were solicited and could be put in an internationally acceptable form. If a significant part of the national territory were held by the democratic forces, formation of an alternative provisional government to request help would be highly desirable. In such a case, the United States might well be willing to provide covert or even overt support, particularly logistical support (POL, food, arms and communication) but to intervene with forces only if there were clear evidence of Soviet Bloc or Cuban intervention on the other side.

Planning and preparation against this contingency should be undertaken. However caution must be exercised against taking preparatory steps which would be susceptible to being prematurely discovered and identified as U.S. preparations to intervene covertly or overtly in Brazil. This could provoke the kinds of developments in Brazil that we are trying to prevent and would be seriously damaging to the United States in its relationships in Brazil, the hemisphere and beyond. Furthermore any action to provide armed support should be specifically and politically

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determined by a careful assessment of the circumstances of the moment and should not be triggered by a predetermined or predefined set of circumstances.

C. Removal of Goulart by Constructive Forces:

This could take place in a variety of ways. No problem would be raised for U.S. policy in the event of a constitutionally contrived change, with Goulart "persuaded" to withdraw and President of the Chamber of Deputies Renieri Mazilli constitutionally succeeding him until the Congress within thirty days elects a new president under the Constitution. But the change might take other forms, including an interim military takeover. In the latter circumstance, we should take a constructive friendly attitude and at the same time press for a quick return to constitutional democratic processes; being prepared to give quick support and assistance to the new regime as soon as it is sufficiently committed to a return to democratic processes.

D. Gradual Extreme Leftist Takeover:

It will be extremely difficult in such a situation to contrive an effective policy toward Brazil. It should be our objective to bring the predominant more moderate and democratic elements in Brazil back into control. Brazil is a very large country and cannot too easily be "pushed around." Therefore the forces for change will have to come from within. The difficulty of contriving

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an effective policy for this contingency adds to the importance of doing everything possible to prevent it from arising. This is the central objective of the September 30 IAFI paper.

Outside Communist Support:

If under this or any other contingency there was clear evidence of outside support from Soviet bloc, Chinese Communist or Cuban sources, alone or with CAS agreement, we should overtly condemn this intervention and seek ways to stop it.

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Fontes

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